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Lifting the cloak, but only a bit

By Robert R. Bowie

THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE. By Allen Dulles.
Harper & Row. 277 pp. \$4.95.

In foreign and military affairs, valid intelligence is the foundation for effective policy. For the policy-maker, it embraces all the information potentially useful in choosing and carrying on a sound course of action. Collecting the relevant data and appraising it have always posed serious problems, but never has the task of gathering intelligence been so staggering as in our time. The arena is the globe—and beyond. Conditions everywhere—in the Sino-Soviet world, in Europe, and in the vast, less developed areas—are in rapid and constant flux. The Communists have made intrigue, subversion and secrecy into major tools of policy. And the long lead-times required for developing weapons and for other activities greatly enhance the premium on foreseeing future trends and strategic developments.

In writing about intelligence, Allen Dulles can draw on practical experience extending over five decades since his graduation from Princeton in 1913. Well over half of his career has been devoted directly to this field and to foreign affairs: as diplomat from 1916 to 1926; in managing espionage from Switzerland and Berlin during and after World War II; and then with the Central Intelligence Agency from 1950 to 1961, the last of these years as its director. And in his intervals of practicing law, he took time out to act as an American advisor on disarmament at the League of Nations and, in 1947-48, assisted President Truman with the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency.

But this is not a volume of memoirs. Instead, Mr. Dulles has undertaken to describe and analyze intelligence as a craft. Starting with a glimpse at espionage in the past and its earlier history in the United States, the book focuses mainly on the current conduct of espionage and counter-espionage by the United States, its allies and the Soviet bloc. Enlivened with actual cases, it explains how agents are recruited and trained. Especially interesting is the analysis of Soviet pressures to recruit agents in non-Communist countries, again with illustrations based on exposures since World War II.

The book ends by focusing on the difficulties of combating Communist subversion and disruption, especially in the unstable societies of the less-developed areas, and of reconciling the need for secrecy on security data with freedom of the press and the role of Congress as overseer of the Executive branch. As he makes clear, Mr. Dulles believes that press releases by competing military services, leaks, and Congressional hearings divulge much more military and related material to our opponents than is required to meet the legitimate needs of Congress or the public. But he is realistic in recognizing the obstacles to any corrective compatible with our system of government and a free

Mr. Dulles disavows any intent to bare unpublished secrets, and the book contains no startling revelations of that kind, though he comments on the CIA estimates of Cuba at the time of the Bay of Pigs and defends the U-2 flights and the handling of the episode after the capture of pilot Powers.

Espionage is obviously the aspect of intelligence which most excites Mr. Dulles. After all, this was the door through which he entered the field in World War I and the activity which he conducted so brilliantly in World War II. Espionage is also the activity where the CIA has primary responsibility, but clearly it is only part of the intelligence field.

In terms of space, however, these important topics hardly receive a balanced share of the book. Espionage produces indispensable data, but the collection, sifting

and analysis of many other types of material are also important in making foreign and even military policy. In relation to the modernizing of the less developed nations, or European integration, for example, the significant material does not come mainly from espionage. Indeed, even the analysis of Soviet and Chinese behavior depends heavily on information and deductions from published sources.

It might be said that this sort of readily accessible intelligence presents no special problems. That is not the case. In some respects it may pose greater difficulties than the conduct of espionage directed at specific targets. To identify the basic features of a situation, to foresee how they will develop, and to judge how far they can or cannot be influenced may well produce a vast configuration of problems, especially in a world so swiftly changing. Yet correct estimates of such matters must be the base of effective long-term policies. Obviously Mr. Dulles is familiar at first hand with these problems; one wishes this book had treated them more fully.

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